

The problem of reason and revelation in the thought of Ibn Taymiyyah

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Abstract---Shaykh al-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (661/1263 - 728/1328), the famous Muslim scholar. A reformer, Ibn Taymiyyah sought the return of Muslims to Islam; by returning to original sources, the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the way of the companions. Until the Muslim returns to the net religion, he finds a problem between reason and revelation (Text: Quran and Sunnah); thus, Ibn Taymiyyah came and dealt with this problem, which is what this article discussed.

Keywords---Mind, revelation, consent of reason and text, religion.

1. Introduction:

This intellectual heritage, which reached its zenith and filled the world with knowledge during one of its historical eras, revealed to us that the issue of "reason" held a privileged and prominent cultural status among scholars, thinkers, and Islamic sects. Its applications were evident not only theoretically but also practically. This is particularly apparent in the discussions of groups like the Jahmiyyah, Mu'tazilah, Ash'aris, Maturidis, and Sufis concerning the doctrine of divine names and attributes, as well as among those whose understanding, knowledge, and approach were influenced by philosophical inquiries into this field.

Philosophy, in this regard, served as a complementary framework to what Arab thought inherited from the pre-Islamic era, as reflected in their poetry and wisdom traditions. This was further enriched by the pure knowledge, understanding, and doctrine brought forth by Islam, as clear as the sun at midday. The prominent position that "reason" occupied in our civilization paved the way for its expansion, especially during the third century AH, a period marked by the translation of philosophical and logical sciences. This period elevated the discourse on reason and led to extensive investigations by Islamic scholars. Many researchers assert that no topic received as much focus and study during this era as the topic of reason and its related fields, including theological, jurisprudential, philosophical, and logical studies.

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Given this context, the structure of Arab reason developed its own unique philosophy and logic, distinct from but influenced by the Greek rational tradition. This intellectual framework reached its apex and contributed to the construction of a civilization shaped by its principles. This is what drew us to delve into this subject and explore its depths. Observing the significance of this topic in the realm of academic studies, we propose the following research question:

Is the authority of reason in Islam equal to the authority of revelation, or is there a preference and predominance of one over the other?

And if there is a conflict between an unequivocal rational conclusion and an authentic textual evidence, what should be done? Should revelation be made the foundation for reason, or should reason be made the foundation for revelation? Or is it possible to find a third path that resolves this duality?

2. Section One: Reason in Language and Terminology:

Firstly: Reason in dictionaries: "The opposite of ignorance. It is said that he became wise, if he knew what he was ignorant of before, or was deterred." About what he used to do, and its plural is 'aql. rational people, and a rational man, if he has good understanding and abundant reason, and his money is rational, is he rational? Thus, **reason** (al-'aql) refers to **al-Hijr** and **al-Nuhā**, which are the opposites of **foolishness** (al-Ḥumq)¹To reason (**'aqala**) means to perceive things as they truly are. Similarly, **'aqala** and **'uqūl** mean to seek refuge or fortify oneself. **'Aqalahu** refers to competing in intellect, while **ta'aqala** means to feign rationality. **Ta'aqqala 'an ḥājati-hi** signifies restraining or preventing oneself from fulfilling a need.

Reason (**'aql**) is what stands in opposition to instinct, which operates without deliberation or examination. For this reason, humans are described as rational animals.

'Aql is the faculty by which thinking, reasoning, constructing concepts, and forming judgments occur. It is through this faculty that one discerns good from evil, truth from falsehood, and beauty from ugliness². Some have added that **'aql** also enables the selection of the better of two good options or the lesser of two evils.

In conclusion, "**aql** is the power of sound judgment, distinguishing truth from falsehood, good from evil, and beauty from ugliness. In this sense, reason is the opposite of whim (**hawā**), which disrupts accurate judgment. **'Aql** is also described as a natural faculty of the soul, prepared for acquiring scientific knowledge and understanding³". The term (Al-'Aql) may be referred to as (knowledge) because it is the locus of understanding. Through it, the soul comprehends both necessary and theoretical sciences. Its existence begins with the conception of a child and continues to grow until it reaches completion at the age of maturity⁴. This is why a person becomes accountable after reaching maturity. It is incorrect to claim that the intellect fully matures at the age of forty, citing the age of our Prophet's (peace be upon him) prophethood as evidence, for not all prophets received their divine mission at this age to make it a proof of intellectual maturity. So, be mindful of this.

Secondly: The Concept of the Mind according to "Ibn Taymiyyah":

Ibn Taymiyyah defined the mind linguistically as follows: "(العقل) in the language of Muslims is derived from the root 'عقل' (to reason), meaning the faculty through which a person distinguishes between good and evil, between what is harmful and beneficial, or between error and correctness. He stated: '(العقل) is the source of understanding, derived from 'عَقَلَ يُعَقِّلُ عَقْلًا' (to comprehend), meaning to grasp and retain knowledge."⁵ .He mentions a similar statement in his refutation of the logicians, indicating that "the mind (العقل) is derived from the root 'عقل يعقل عقلا' (to reason and comprehend)."⁶. He clarified that this "pertains to the intellect (العقل) which distinguishes humans, as it enables them to perceive the consequences of actions that the senses alone cannot grasp. The term 'العقل' (intellect) in the Quran encompasses what brings benefit and repels harm."⁷

That is, it brings about both religious and worldly benefits within the framework of Sharia, given that "the default ruling for things is permissibility." This remains the case unless there is a specific legal text that nullifies this general principle through specification, restriction of the absolute, or similar methods elaborated by scholars of Islamic jurisprudence. It is evident from this definition that he disagrees with "Sibawayh" (148-180 AH / 765-796 CE), rejecting the notion that the intellect is a source (of rulings).

3. The Intellect in Terminology:

3.1. The Intellect in the Terminology of Revelation:

The term "العقل" (the intellect) in its exact form—as a verbal noun—does not appear in the Quran. Instead, it is conveyed through its derivatives and related terms. By examining the verses of the Quran, we can identify six terms that signify or parallel the concept of the However, we will not delve into an exhaustive analysis here, as that has been detailed elsewhere. Instead, we will provide a few examples:

Ta'qilūn (تَعْقِلُونَ): This term appears in the Noble Qur'an **twenty-four times**, including in the verse: **"Do you enjoin righteousness upon others while you forget yourselves, even though you recite the Scripture Will you not then reason?"** (Al-Baqarah 2:44)

Ya'qilūn (يَعْقِلُونَ): This term appears **twenty-one times** in the Noble Qur'an, including in the verse: **"Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the alternation of the night and the day, and the ships that sail in the sea for the benefit of people, and what Allah has sent down from the sky of water—giving life thereby to the earth after its lifelessness and dispersing therein every creature, and the directing of the winds and the clouds controlled between the heaven and the earth—are signs for a people who reason."** (Al-Baqarah 2:164)

Aqalūh (عَقَلُوهُ): in the verse: **"Do you covet [the hope], O believers, that they would believe for you, while a party of them used to hear the words of Allah and then distort it after they had understood it, while they knew [the truth]?"** (Al-Baqarah 2:75) . They are like cattle; they possess only the intellect of instinct. They do not have the innate intellect by which they comprehend divine guidance from Allah.

Ya'qiluhā (يَعْقِلُهَا): in the verse: **"And these are the parables We set forth for the people, but none will understand them except those of knowledge."** (Al-'Ankabūt 29:43).

Na'qilu (نَعْقِلُ): in the verse: **"And they will say, 'If only we had listened or reasoned, we would not be among the companions of the Blaze.'" (Al-Mulk 67:10).** They prioritized hearing over reasoning, indicating that the former is the foundation of the latter—contrary to what the rationalists claim.

As for the synonyms of "reason" (العقل), they include: **heart (القلب), inner heart (الغُوداد), intellect (اللب), judgment (الحجر), wisdom (النُّهى), and forbearance (الجُم)**:

The heart is mentioned in the Holy Quran with the meaning of intellect in several places, approximately "one hundred and thirty-two times," in singular, dual, and plural forms more frequently. Allah has clarified in His Book that understanding revelation occurs through the heart, as He says: "Many of the jinn and mankind have hearts with which they do not understand." (Al-A'raf: 179).

Here lies a profound insight that I have not read in any book nor seen anyone highlight: the Quran explicitly states that the jinn have hearts, and they reason with them. However, unlike humans—whose hearts are described as being in their chests—the Quran does not specify the location of the hearts of the jinn.

Al-Fu'ād is one of the synonyms for intellect in the Holy Quran, and scholars have differed regarding its meaning. Sometimes, it is considered the same as the heart, while at other times, it is viewed as distinct. Many people differentiate between the **qalb** (heart) and the **fu'ād**, while others do not.

It has been stated that "the heart is a piece of flesh, and the fu'ād is suspended by the arteries." Ibn Sidah also mentioned: "The heart is the fu'ād"⁸. Perhaps one of the subtle distinctions can be derived from the words of the Prophet Peace be upon him:

"The people of Yemen have come to you; they are more tender in **afu'idah** (hearts) and softer in **qulūb** (hearts)." (Sahih al-Bukhari)⁹

Al-Lubb (The Core/Intellect): Allah Almighty has linked rulings that can only be comprehended by intelligent and refined minds to Ulū al-Albāb (those endowed with intellect), as in His saying:

"He grants wisdom to whom He wills, and whoever is granted wisdom has certainly been given much good. But none will remember except those of understanding." (Al-Baqarah: 269)

The phrase "Lubb of a person" refers to one possessing deep intellect and discernment. The verb "labba" signifies becoming endowed with reason and wisdom¹⁰.

Al-Ḥilm (Forbearance): "Al-Ḥilm" refers to self-restraint and composure. Its plural form is "Aḥlām". Allah Almighty says: "**Do their minds command them to this, or are they a transgressing people?**" (At-Tur: 32), Some interpreters have stated that "**Aḥlām**" here means minds or intellects, while others differentiate between ḥilm and 'aql, asserting that ḥilm is not synonymous with intellect. A more detailed discussion on this distinction lies beyond the scope of this explanation.

Al-Ḥijr: The intellect has been called ḥijr because it restrains its possessor from doing what is unnecessary. A person is also described by this term because they prevent themselves from following their desires. The Qur'an states:

"**Is there in that an oath for one of reason?**" (Al-Fajr: 5).

An-Nuhā: The intellect has been called nuhā because it adheres to what is commanded and does not exceed it. It has also been said that it is named so because it prevents one from committing immoral acts¹¹. And Allah mentioned this term in two places in His Book, including His saying: "**Has it not guided them how many generations We destroyed before them, in whose dwellings they now walk? Indeed, in that are signs for those of sound intellect (ulū an-nuhā).**" (Taha: 128)

That is, for those who possess reason and understandin.

3.2. Expressions Indicating the Functions of the Intellect and Its Role in Legal Responsibility:

Just as the intellect has been referenced through terms that indicate its functions, since it is the basis of legal responsibility (manāṭ at-taklīf), Allah's words have expressed it through concepts like reflection (nazar), sight (baṣar), reason (lub), and sound judgment (nuhā), as in His saying:

It has appeared in the form of "**contemplation**" (التفكر) seventeen times, including variations such as "**you contemplate**" (تتفكرون), "**they contemplate**" (يتفكرون), "**they may contemplate**" (يتفكروا), and "**you may contemplate**" (تتفكروا). Here are just a few examples:

-It has appeared in the form "**تتفكرون**" (**you contemplate**) three times in the Qur'an, including the verse:

"**Thus does Allah make clear to you the signs, so that you may contemplate.**" (Al-Baqarah: 219)

It is also repeated in **Al-Baqarah: 266**.

-And it has appeared in the form "**تتفكروا**" (**you contemplate**) once in the verse:

"**Say, 'I only advise you of one thing: that you stand for Allah, in pairs and individually, and then contemplate.'**" (Saba: 46)

-And it has appeared in the form "**فَفَكَّرَ**" (**he pondered**) once in the verse:

"**Indeed, he pondered and deliberated. So may he be destroyed—how he deliberated!**" (Al-Muddathir: 18-19)

-The word "يتفكرون" appears eleven times in the form "they reflect." Allah says: "And they reflect upon the creation of the heavens" (Aal-E-Imran: 191).

-The word "يتفكروا" appears twice in the form "they reflect," one of which is in the verse: "Do they not reflect upon themselves?" (Ar-Rum: 8).

-The word "النظر" appears three times in the form "they look," as in the verse: "Do they not look at the camels, how they are created?" (Al-Ghashiyah: 17).

-The word "الذِّكْر" (mention/reminder) appears in various forms (ليذكروا, ويذكرون, ويذكروا, ويذكروا, and similar). The form "يذكرون" is repeated five times, one of which is in the verse: "And We have certainly diversified in this Qur'an, that they may be reminded, but it increases them not except in aversion."

(Al-Isra: 41). The form "يَذْكُر" appears seven times, one of which is in the verse: "Does man not remember that We created him before, while he was nothing?" (Maryam: 67). The form "يَذْكُرُونَ" appears six times in the Qur'an, each instance related to the idea of remembering due to something. One of these occurrences is in the verse: "And this is the straight path of your Lord. We have detailed the verses for a people who remember." (Al-An'am: 126). The form "يَذْكُرُونَ" appears twice, one of which is in the verse: "And when they are reminded, they do not remember." (As-Saffat: 13). The form "يَذْكُرُوا" appears twice, and it is used to urge people to remember in the Qur'an, as in the verse: "And We have certainly diversified in this Qur'an, that they may be reminded, but it increases them not except in aversion." (Al-Isra: 41). The form "التدبر" (reflection) appears in variations such as "يَتَذَبَّرُوا" and "يَتَذَبَّرُونَ". One of the instances of "يَتَذَبَّرُوا" is in the verse: "This is a blessed Book which We have revealed to you, that they may reflect upon its verses and that those of understanding may be reminded." (Sad: 29). The form "يَتَذَبَّرُونَ" appears twice, one of which is in the verse: "Do they not reflect upon the Qur'an? Had it been from other than Allah, they would have found within it much contradiction." (An-Nisa: 82). The form "الحكمة" (wisdom) appears in variations such as "تَحْكُم", "تَحْكُمُوا", and "تَحْكُمُونَ". The form "تَحْكُمُونَ" appears four times, one of which is in the verse: "Is it that the one who guides to the truth more worthy to be followed, or the one who does not guide unless he himself is guided? So what is [wrong] with you? How do you judge?" (Yunus: 35). The form "تَحْكُمُوا" appears once, as in the verse: "And when you judge between people, to judge with justice. Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever Hearing and Seeing." (An-Nisa: 58). The form "الفهم" (understanding) appears in the verse: "Then We gave understanding of it to Solomon. And to both of them We gave judgment and knowledge. And We subjected the mountains to praise with him and the birds as well. And We were doing [all things]." (Al-Anbiya: 79), indicating that Allah granted Solomon understanding, giving him a vastness in intellect.

4. In the Terminology of Ibn Taymiyyah

The concept of 'aql (intellect) in the terminology of this scholar—who likely had extensive knowledge of all that has been mentioned above and more—is evidenced by his writings, which are filled with these statements and many others from scholars of creed ('aqidah), theologians ('ilm al-kalām), philosophers, Sufis, as well as Jewish and Christian thinkers, among many others.

4.1. 'Aql (Intellect) in Ibn Taymiyyah's Thought ;

Thus, his understanding of 'aql can be summarized in precise statements, among which we have chosen the following as an introduction:

The term "'aql" (intellect) may refer to: The innate faculty by which knowledge is attained, The various types of knowledge that this faculty acquires, Acting upon the knowledge derived from this faculty¹². With this assertion, **Ibn Taymiyyah** refutes the idea that reason ('aql) is an accident ('arad). However, even if one were to assume, for the sake of argument, that it is an accident, he adds:

"Whether it is called an accident or an attribute, it is not a self-subsisting entity ('ayn qā'im binafsihā), whether it is termed a substance, a body, or anything else. The term 'reason' is only used to refer to the rational self (al-dhāt al-'āqilah), which is a self-subsisting substance (jawhar qā'im binafsih). This usage appears in the discourse of certain philosophers who speak of reason ('aql) and the soul (nafs), and who claim the existence of ten intellects, as reported by some of those who follow Aristotle or other Peripatetic philosophers. And this notion has been adopted by some individuals affiliated with various religious traditions."¹³ He also refuted the **Mu'tazilite** philosophy, which is based on the idea that reason ('aql) is a creation among God's creations, similar to other things, and that God commands it to come and go, and the like. He ruled that everything narrated about the virtue of reason is fabricated and baseless, not recognized by experts in **hadith criticism** (ahl al-ṣinā'a al-ḥadithiyya). A detailed discussion of this will follow in its proper place.

Section Two: Transmission (Naql) in Language and Terminology

First: Transmission (Naql)—Hearing (Sam'), the Qur'anic and Prophetic Texts—In Language and the Terminology of Revelation

4.2. Transmission (Naql) in Language:

Naql refers to the act of transferring something from one place to another. The verb naqala (yanqulunaqlan) means "to transfer," and from it derives intaqala ("to move or shift"). The term tanqqul signifies movement or transition, while naqqalahu (tanqīlan) implies frequent transferring.

Additionally, naqal denotes the act of reviewing or repeating speech. The phrase naqaltafulānan al-ḥadīth means "you relayed and exchanged speech with someone." A person described as naqil is one who is eloquent and quick-witted in speech and response. Meanwhile, tanāqala al-qawm al-kalām refers to a group exchanging and discussing words among themselves¹⁴. And the **"Transmitted Sciences" (Al-'Ulūm Al-Naqliyyah)** refer to those disciplines that rely on transmission (naql) as their foundational source¹⁵. And which the intellect has transmitted; it is also referred to as nass (text). In linguistic usage, nass has threemeanings:

- . **According to Al-Shāfi'i**, the term nass refers to what is apparent (ẓāhir).
- . **In the Arabic language**, nass signifies clarity or prominence, referring to a wording that strongly suggests a particular meaning.
- . **The most widely accepted meaning** is that nass denotes an explicit statement that allows for no alternative interpretation, such as the number five, which is unequivocal in its meaning and admits no other possibility.¹⁶

Transmission (naql) is also referred to as sam'ah (hearing) and al-sam'iyāt (the transmitted sciences), as it is attributed to hearing (sam'), derived from the verb sami'a – yasma'u – sam'an (to hear). This is reflected in the words of Allah Almighty:

"And when Our verses are recited to him, he turns away arrogantly as if he had not heard them, as if there were deafness in his ears. So give him tidings of a painful punishment." (Luqman: 7)

The term sam' (hearing) appears in the Quran approximately 116 times, carrying various meanings. One of its meanings pertains to the context at hand, as seen in the verse about the devils:

"Indeed, they have been kept away from hearing [the revelation]." (Al-Shu'ara: 212)

This signifies that they are barred from hearing divine revelation.

4.3. Transmission (Hearing) in the Terminology of Revelation

The term hearing (sam') appears in the Quran in eleven instances, such as:

"And among them are those who listen to you, but can you make the deaf hear, even though they do not use reason?" (Yunus: 42)

This verse refers metaphorically to those who fail to comprehend the sam'iyāt (transmitted religious sciences) due to their objections, such as claiming that these teachings were never heard from their forefathers:

"They were not able to hear, nor could they see." (Hud: 20)

Similarly, those who acknowledge revelation yet do not receive it from the Messenger are likened to:

"Whoever stealthily listens (to it) is pursued by a clear burning flame." (Al-Hijr: 18)

This applies to the jinn, as also mentioned in:

"And we used to take up positions to hear [the revelation]; but whoever listens now will find a flaming fire waiting for him." (Al-Jinn: 9)

This is a powerful refutation of the Bāṭiniyyah (esotericists) and the philosophers who claim that revelation is mere imagination. If the Prophet Peace be upon him were inventing revelation, then what were the jinn hearing from the heavens?

5. Transmission (Naql) or Hearing (Sam') Also Refers to the Sunnah, Which Is Revelation Like the Quran

Linguistically, Sunnah means a way or path, as in Sunnat al-awwalīn—the way and tradition of the earlier generations.

In technical terminology, the Sunnah is classified into two categories:

- 5.1. **According to the jurists (fuqahā’)**, it refers to actions that are below the level of obligation (wājib), such as recommended (mandūb) and desirable (mustahabb) acts.
- 5.2. **According to the hadith scholars (muḥaddithūn)**, the Sunnah encompasses everything that has been transmitted from the Prophet Peace be upon him in terms of his sayings, actions, and approvals (taqrīrāt), except for matters related to personal habits and customs (Sunan al-‘ādah)¹⁷. Thus, the Sunnah is part of naql (transmission), and it is also **revelation (waḥy)** by the explicit text of the **Qur’an**, authentic Sunnah, and the consensus (ijmā’) of the Companions. If the Sunnah were not revelation, Allah would not have commanded its reference alongside the Qur’an, which is His actual speech in a literal sense, not figuratively.

There is an important point here that every Muslim understands: If Allah had commanded us to refer only to the Qur’an while casting doubt on the Sunnah and rejecting it entirely, how would people know how to perform their prayers? How would they know that the prescribed daily prayers are five in number, along with their **pillars, conditions, Sunnah acts, and etiquettes**? This is where we grasp the significance of the Prophet’s Peace be upon him statement:

"Pray as you have seen me pray." (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī)¹⁸

The Sunnah has transmitted to us the jurisprudential understanding (fiqh) of the **Qur’an**, just as it has clarified the rulings on fasting and the obligation of Hajj. Regarding Hajj, the Prophet Peace be upon him said:

"Take your rites from me, for I do not know whether I shall perform Hajj again after this one." (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim)¹⁹

Likewise, the Sunnah has conveyed many other details of this pure religion. Without it, how would one understand the specifics of the **Qur’an’s commands**? This would be impossible. Thus, it remains to be stated that **preservation (ḥifẓ)** applies to both the **Qur’an and the Sunnah**.

Transmission (Naql or Sam’) in the Terminology of Ibn Taymiyyah

Ibn Taymiyyah does not use naql to refer to **heritage as a whole**, but rather to what we have previously defined—namely, the **mutawātir Qur’an** and the **authentic Sunnah**. He sometimes refers to these as sam‘iyyāt (the transmitted sciences), waḥy (revelation), or naql (transmission), because the Sunnah, like the Qur’an, is divine revelation. We have already elaborated on this in **Chapter Two**.

Thus, his definition of naql aligns with that of the **major scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah**, including the **Four Imams**, the Tābi‘ūn before them, and the Ṣaḥābah before them, as well as what the Prophet Peace be upon him and the **Qur’an** itself have conveyed.

The Qur’an affirms this meaning in numerous places, including:

"Indeed, We have sent down the Reminder (al-Dhikr), and indeed, We will preserve it." (Al-Ḥijr: 9)

Some have interpreted the pronoun dhikr (reminder) here as referring to the Prophet Peace be upon him, citing the verse:

"O Messenger, convey what has been revealed to you from your Lord. And if you do not do so, then you have not conveyed His message. And Allah will protect you from the people. Indeed, Allah does not guide the disbelieving people." (Al-Mā’idah: 67)

However, the relevant phrase in this verse—**"And Allah will protect you from the people"**—is a weak argument for such an interpretation²⁰. Some scholars have interpreted the pronoun in the verse:

"Indeed, We have sent down the Reminder (al-Dhikr), and indeed, We will preserve it." (Al-Ḥijr: 9)

as referring **exclusively to the Qur’an**, which is the prevalent view among the majority of exegetes (mufasssīrūn).

However, others have argued that it refers to **both the Qur’an and the Sunnah**. This interpretation is supported by scholars from both past and present generations, including:

- **‘Izz al-Dīn ibn ‘Abd al-Salām** (577–660 AH)
- **Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya**
- **Muḥammad Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Albānī** (1914–1999 CE)

- **Salīm al-Hilālī** (b. 1957 CE)

Chapter Three: The Problem of Reason (‘Aql) and Transmission (Naql) in Ibn Taymiyyah's Thought:

First: Ibn Taymiyyah discusses the issue of **reason and transmission** in various places across his works. His discussions are **scattered** throughout different books, some of which his prominent student **al-Dhahabi** estimated to exceed **a thousand volumes**, with some spanning multiple volumes. These discussions will be cited in their appropriate contexts.

For example, in Juz’ al-‘Aqīdah, he **refutes those who oppose reason and transmission** on matters of **faith (īmān)**.

In Tawḥīd al-Ulūhiyyahwa al-Rubūbiyyah, he engages with **Christian theologians**, exposing their errors in the doctrine of **Trinity**, demonstrating that it contradicts **both reason and revelation**.

Likewise, in Fatāwā al-Kubrā, he addresses similar concerns.

Additionally, he has dedicated independent treatises to the subject, such as **“Risālahfī al-‘Aqlwa al-Rūḥ”** (Treatise on Reason and the Soul)²¹, Ibn Taymiyyah also addresses the issue **scattered throughout his major work**, Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā, which spans **thirty-seven volumes**. However, he dedicates an **entire book** specifically to this problem, titled:

- **"Dar’ Ta‘arūḍ al-‘Aqlwa al-Naql"** (Averting the Contradiction Between Reason and Revelation),
- Also known as **"Daf’ Ta‘arūḍ al-Shar‘ wa al-‘Aql"** (Repelling the Contradiction Between Islamic Law and Reason),
- Or **"MuwāfaqatSharīḥ al-Ma‘qūl li Ṣaḥīḥ al-Manqūl"** (The Agreement of Pure Reason with Authentic Transmission)²².

5.3. Ibn Taymiyyah continues to explore the issue in several of his works, including:

- **"Minhāj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah"** (The Methodology of the Prophetic Tradition),
- **"Al-Ṣafadiyyah"**,
- **"Al-Radd ‘alā al-Manṭiqiyyīn"** (Refutation of the Logicians),
- **"Bayān Dar’ Ta‘arūḍ al-‘Aqlwa al-Naql"** (Clarification of Averting the Contradiction Between Reason and Revelation),
- **"Al-Nubuwwāt"**, in which he refers to the subject as **"KitābMan‘ Ta‘arūḍ al-‘Aqlwa al-Naql"** (The Book of Preventing the Contradiction Between Reason and Revelation),
- **"Al-Jawāb al-ṢaḥīḥlimanBaddalaDīn al-Masīḥ"** (The Correct Response to Those Who Altered the Religion of Christ),
- **"Al-FurqānbaynaAwliyā’ al-RaḥmānwaAwliyā’ al-Shayṭān"** (The Criterion Between the Allies of the Most Merciful and the Allies of Satan), where he also refers to the subject as **"Radd Ta‘arūḍ al-‘Aqlwa al-Naql"** (Refuting the Contradiction Between Reason and Revelation).

His students also used **varied titles** for the same theme, including:

- **"Al-Muwāfaqabayn al-Ma‘qūlwa al-Manqūl"** (The Agreement Between Reason and Transmission)²³

Or **"Al-Jam‘ bayna al-‘Aqlwa al-Naql"** (The Reconciliation Between Reason and Transmission)²⁴

Or **"Daf’ al-Ta‘arūḍ al-‘Aqlīwa al-Naqlī"** (The Refutation of the Conflict Between Reason and Transmission), and likewise, **Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya** refers to it as **"BayānMuwāfaqat al-‘Aql al-Ṣaḥīḥli-Naql al-Ṣaḥīḥ"** (Clarification of the Agreement Between Pure Reason and Authentic Transmission)²⁵, This book, which he praises in his Nūniyyah, commending his teacher’s work and stating the reason for its composition, saying:

"Read the book of Reason and Transmission, for which...

There exists no second like it in the world.

And what is astonishing is that with their own weapon...

He cast them down to the lowest depths."

You can also find further discussions and variations on this issue in his extensive works, such as *Al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā* and *Minhāj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyah*, among many others. Writing such a vast number of books, treatises, and essays undoubtedly indicates that **Ibn Taymiyyah** spoke on a wide range of disciplines, demonstrating profound knowledge, extensive expertise, and a keen intellectual presence.

When he expounds on **ideological and theological doctrines**, he writes with the pen of an expert, as seen in *Sharḥ Awwal al-Muḥaṣṣal*. His strong grasp of **history** also enabled him to analyze the problem from a historical perspective. Moreover, his **mastery of tafsīr (Qur'anic exegesis)** allowed him to deeply investigate the meaning of transmission (naql) and how the early generations (al-salaf) understood it.

His expertise in **ḥadīth sciences** was so profound that his student, **Ibn al-Qayyim**, remarked: "Every ḥadīth unknown to our shaykh is not a ḥadīth at all," or, "There is no ḥadīth in the world except that our shaykh has knowledge of it."

This granted him **exceptional authority in verifying transmission (naql) and its relationship with reason ('aql)**. His deep familiarity with the **traditions of the early scholars (āthār al-salaf)** is evident, as he cites reports that are often unavailable elsewhere—earning him the title "The Reviver of the Salafi Method."

As for his **knowledge of books and scholarly opinions**, it is beyond description—one only needs to browse through *Majmū' al-Fatāwā* to witness the vastness of his scholarship.

Regarding **Arabic linguistics**, he was an outstanding grammarian. He even refuted **Sībawayh**, challenging him on nearly fifty grammatical issues, demonstrating his remarkable command of the Arabic language. Check his refutations against the **Mu'tazilites, Jahmiyyah, and Ash'arites** on the issue of *kalāmnafsī* (internal speech) in *Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah*, where his arguments leave the mind bewildered. Similarly, he has numerous objections to various **philosophical, mystical, and theological sects**, writing dedicated treatises for single issues.

His **extensive refutations** targeted **those who distorted the meaning of transmission (naql) and reason ('aql)**, including long discussions in *Al-Jawāb al-Ṣaḥīḥ li-Man Baddala Dīn al-Masīḥ*, where he debates Christian beliefs that later influenced some Sufi Muslim groups who neglected traditional texts (athar).

All these writings align with his **projects on religious methodology**, such as *Minhāj al-Istiḳāmah* and *Al-Siyāsah al-Shar'iyyah*. He refuted **North African scholars**, just as he **countered Eastern objections**. He explored **foundations of religion** to establish the principles of Islam, leading him to write:

- *Al-Radd 'alā al-Manṭiqiyyīn* (Refutation of the Logicians)
- *Al-Radd 'alā al-Falāsifah* (Refutation of the Philosophers)
- *Jawābfi Naqḍihim* (A Response in Refuting Them)
- *Qā'idahfī al-Qaḍāyā al-Wahmiyyah* (A Principle on Illusory Matters)
- *Qā'idahfīmāYatanāhāwa-māLāYatanāhā* (A Principle on What is Finite and Infinite)
- *Al-Risālah al-Ṣafadiyyah* (The Ṣafadiyyah Treatise), proving **the miracles of prophets are not mere psychological powers**.

For this reason, he also defended **resurrection (al-ma'ād)** against **Ibn Sinā**, and he provided **commentaries on classical texts**, such as his explanation of **Ibn 'Abdūs's treatise on Imām Aḥmad's²⁶ theological principles**. He also addressed the issue of "**Mā Bayn al-Lawḥayn waKalāmAllāh**" (The Question of What is Between the Two Tablets and the Speech of God), along with "**TaḥqīqKalāmAllāh li-Mūsā**" (Clarifying God's Speech to Moses).

Additionally, he explored the **debate on whether Jibrīl heard the actual speech of God or merely transmitted it from the Preserved Tablet (al-Lawḥ al-Maḥfūz)**. This was part of his **refutation of**

the concept of "internal speech" (al-kalām al-nafsī), which he invalidated from nearly eighty different perspectives.

He also authored a fascinating book discussing **whether the Throne (al-‘Arsh) and the heavens are spherical, and why hearts instinctively turn toward the direction of the heavens (jiha al-‘ulū)**²⁷, Ibn Taymiyyah explored the position of reason within the heart and followed this with a discussion on whether something can exist in a state of elevation (‘uluw) without being a substance (jawhar) or an accident (‘araḍ), and whether this concept is rationally conceivable or impossible. He then expanded on the reality of istiwā’ (divine establishment) and nuzūl (divine descent), and whether the implications of a doctrine necessarily follow from it. These discussions were purely rational and deeply engaging.

He further elaborated on the issue of divine descent and its timing differences across various lands and astronomical horizons, offering an explanation of the ḥadīth on divine descent while affirming the distinction between God and His creation, both rationally and scripturally.

This was evident in his work Al-Masā’il al-Iskandariyya, which refuted the doctrines of ittihād (unionism) and ḥulūl (incarnationism).

Additionally, he dedicated a detailed refutation to the pantheistic and heretical ideas contained in Ibn ‘Arabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, which he deemed to promote disbelief, atheism, incarnation (ḥulūl), and unity of existence (ittihād). His efforts aimed at safeguarding true faith and ensuring its alignment with authentic Islamic teachings.

Secondly: Ten Principles That Prevent Conflict Between Reason and Revelation :

These principles are the ones elaborated in Dar’ Ta’āruḍ al-‘Aql wa-l-Naql (Averting the Conflict Between Reason and Revelation). Ibn Taymiyyah formulated them to refute the misconceptions of the **anthropomorphists (mushabbihah)**, the **interpreters (mu’awwilūn)**, the **philosophers (falāsifah)**, the **mystics (mutaṣawwifah)**, and the **theologians (mutakallimūn)**—particularly the rationalists who exalted reason while diminishing revelation under its pretext.

In this work, he engages with their arguments, clarifying the response of the Prophet Peace be upon him regarding these issues. He systematically dismantles the **perceived rational objections** that some thinkers have raised against revelation, demonstrating the **impossibility of prioritizing their objections over the words of the prophets**.

In doing so, he exposes the **flaws in the so-called rationalist principle** that misled people and diverted them from the message of the Prophet. His refutations span over **forty arguments**, with **eighteen** presented in the first volume, the **nineteenth and twentieth** in the second, and so forth. Further details and elaborations follow throughout the rest of the book.

Despite Ibn Taymiyyah's acknowledgment of the difficulty of addressing this issue, he establishes **comprehensive principles** that he adheres to himself and imposes upon his opponents. His argument is that anyone who discusses this problem while disregarding the positions of the **leading scholars**—who sought reconciliation between reason and revelation—will inevitably make fundamental errors. These errors will be found in **core principles, doctrinal formulations, and foundational arguments** that are based on **unlawful and non-revelatory premises**. Whether they realize it or not, such mistakes will ultimately work against them.

5.4. As for these **fundamental principles**, Ibn Taymiyyah states:

"Whoever claims that reason contradicts revelation has erred in the following fundamental principles..."

First Principle: Clear and sound reason does not contradict authentic revelation.

Second Principle: Rather, it is in agreement with revelation.

Third Principle: What some claim to be "reason" that contradicts revelation is not actually valid reason.

Fourth Principle: The so-called "rational arguments" that are said to oppose revelation are, in reality, opposed to true reason itself.

Fifth Principle: The arguments they use to establish fundamental principles—such as proving the existence of the Creator and His attributes—do not actually affirm them; rather, they contradict their own assertions.

Sixth Principle: The terms reason (‘aql) and transmitted knowledge (sam‘) have become ambiguous. Anyone who introduces an idea based on personal opinion labels it as “rational.”

Seventh Principle: "Many of the scholars of kalām (theological rhetoric) consider the evidence of the Qur’an and hadith to be based solely on transmitted reports (khabar mujarrad)." Consequently, they are forced to treat rational sciences as the primary source and transmitted knowledge as secondary—just as was done by Abū al-Ma‘ālī, AbūḤāmid, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and others.

Eighth Principle: Opponents of revelation can generally be categorized into three groups based on how they understand the issue:

- Some completely turn away from rational proofs.
- Some acknowledge them but misunderstand them.
- Some comprehend them correctly.

Ninth Principle: The Companions of the Prophet never found any contradiction between reason and revelation. If such a contradiction had existed, they would have transmitted it to us. Thus, the problem lies in the reasoning of those who came after them.

Tenth Principle: "The companions of AbūḤanīfah narrated from AbūYūsuf, who reported from AbūḤanīfah, that he said: 'No one should speak about Allah based on their own opinion'²⁸. According to these ten principles, Ibn Taymiyyah establishes Qur’anic foundations, prophetic guidelines, and fundamental principles that align with the two revelations. Through these, he formulates a comprehensive framework to refute the opposing law. Additionally, he presents a fourth category that dismantles and invalidates the foundations of his opponents, uprooting them entirely. He then follows this with a discussion on "specific evidences."

6. Ibn Taymiyyah and the four fundamental issues; here Ibn Taymiyyah attempts to establish four fundamental issues in the discussion of Dar’ Ta‘āruḍ al-‘Aqlwa al-Naql (Averting the Contradiction Between Reason and Revelation).

6.1. From these, general principles; From these, general principles will emerge, which he relies upon in addressing the problem. He engages with those who claim that reason contradicts revelation, clarifying four key positions:

- .That reason does not contradict revelation.
- .Then, he clarifies that reason actually aligns with revelation.
- .He further demonstrates that the rational arguments they use to oppose revelation are false.
- .Additionally, he proves that pure reason itself contradicts them.²⁹

Fourth: Ten Principles for Resolving the Conflict Between Reason and Revelation.

6.2. The First Principle: Clear rational truths are those whose arrangement is correct and can only be true.

1-"If its premises and arrangement are correct, it can only be true and will not contradict anything said by the Messenger. The Quran has indicated rational evidences...

2-In the Quran, there is an explanation of the fundamentals of religion, whose premises are known through pure reason, in a manner unparalleled in the speech of any human.

3-Rather, most of the rational proofs presented by the most skilled debaters are summarized in the Quran, along with what is even better than them."³⁰

Second Principle: What is established through definitive evidence does not conflict or contradict at all. It does not contradict itself, nor does it contradict anything else that is definitively proven with the same level of certainty.

"Two certain proofs never contradict each other—whether they are both rational, both scriptural, or one is rational and the other scriptural. Whoever assumes that they contradict has made an error, either by mistakenly believing that one of them is definitive when it is not, or by assuming certainty in both when neither is actually definitive."³¹

Third Principle: Rational analogy and the textual evidence go hand in hand:

1-"Authentic rational and religious evidences do not contradict each other.

2-the principles of analogical reasoning and the indications of textual revelation do not conflict. A thorough examination of cases where it was claimed that analogy contradicted the text shows that whenever the lawgiver specified a ruling different from similar cases, it was due to a unique attribute that justified the distinct ruling.³²

Forth principle: These evidences are among the signs of Allah that confirm the truthfulness of the prophets, as Allah says:

"We will show them Our signs in the horizons and within themselves until it becomes clear to them that it is the truth." (Fussilat: 53)

These signs are part of Allah's balance, or they are His scale of justice.

Fifth Principle: If revelation (sam') aligns with reason ('aql), then in matters that reason negates, it is obligatory to speak of them in terms of negation—just as is done with what reason affirms.

If this is not done, then remaining silent on the matter is safer for the ummah³³.

Sixth Principle: If it were assumed that pure reason ('aqlṣarīḥ) contradicts some transmitted reports (akhbār), then one of two consequences would necessarily follow: either the transmitter (nāqil) must be deemed false, or the transmitted text (manqūl) must be interpreted (ta'wīl).

However, praise be to Allah, this has never occurred, nor should it ever occur, for Allah's preservation of what He has revealed—both the Book and the Wisdom—prevents such a contradiction³⁴. And Allah, the Exalted, said: **"Indeed, it is We who sent down the Reminder, and indeed, We will be its Guardian."** (Al-Hijr: 9)

Yes, there are instances that appear to contradict this principle, but they are found in **fabricated** (mawḍū') hadiths, such as the narration **"The first thing Allah created was the intellect"**, which **Al-Suyūṭī** mentioned in "Al-La'ālī al-Maṣnū'afi al-Aḥādīth al-Mawḍū'a"³⁵, And "Ibn Hajar Al-Asqalani" in Fath al-Bari, Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, affirmed that: "The hadith 'The first thing Allah created was the intellect' has no authentic chain of transmission."³⁶, And likewise, Al-Albani in Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Da'ifahwa al-Mawdu'ah, waAtharuha al-Sayyi' fi al-Ummah (under Hadith No. 1253) commented on the narration:

"Then He created the intellect. The Almighty said: 'I have not created a creation more wondrous to Me than you. By My might...'"

Al-Albani remarked: "This narration, with this chain of transmission, is false and reprehensible (batilmunkar)"³⁷, And he adds in the same series, commenting on Hadith No. 2345 from Al-Da'ifah, saying:

"There is no authentic narration regarding the intellect. In fact, Ibn Taymiyyah said: (All of them are fabricated)"³⁸, This has already been discussed in the first chapter. This is not the place for elaboration through questions and answers.

6.3. Seventh Principle: Reason does not contradict revelation, and whatever contradicts it is false:

1. it is not merely said that it does not contradict, but rather that it agrees and affirms. Those people used to say that it denies and opposes.

2. (First) Demonstrate that it neither denies nor contradicts. Then, (Second) show that it affirms and agrees.³⁹

Eighth Principle: The Conflict of Evidence for the Mufti and the Muqallid

Just as when the **legal evidences** (adillashar‘iyya) appear to be in conflict—whether for the **mujtahid scholar** (al-nāẓir al-mujtahid) or the **layperson seeking a fatwa** (al-muqallid al-mustaftī)—one cannot simply prefer one over the other without proper methodology...

1. And at times, one of them may be given preference—either based on a dream, the opinion of an advising counselor, or by perceiving the benefit in one of the two actions.

2. As for preferring one opinion based solely on personal choice—such that when the evidences appear equal to someone, they favor one merely by their own will and selection—this is not the view of any of the Imams of Islam. Rather, it is the position of a group among the theologians. However, some jurists have stated this regarding the layperson seeking a fatwa, saying: "He is given the choice between the differing muftis."⁴⁰

Ninth Principle: "Revelation and reason contradict innovations that oppose the Book, the Sunnah, and the way of the predecessors; however, they do not contradict each other."⁴¹

Tenth Principle: "As for what is established by reason, the one affirming it must properly conceive it; otherwise, he has spoken without knowledge." This is because he has not fully grasped its reality, and judgment on something is dependent on its proper conception.⁴²

7. Research Summary:

It is not permissible to follow conjecture and personal desires, as this leads to distortion in matters of revelation and sophistry in rational inquiries. The correct approach aligns with the Sharia and is in harmony with the innate rational disposition. This is because the innate rational standard corresponds to the revealed truth. However, it must be acknowledged that one may grasp one of these aspects while failing to grasp the other.

If this is the case, then all that is established by both textual and rational evidence is truth, as there is no contradiction between sound rational evidence that leads to knowledge. Any perceived contradiction arises from the mind of the objector, not from the reasoning of the one who harmonizes them, for correct evidence only points to the truth.

It should also be noted that many disputes stem from weak foundational premises. This weakness may arise from textual evidence that is either unauthenticated or improperly understood, or from rational claims mistakenly perceived as contradicting revelation when they do not. Additionally, some may confuse mere imaginations with rational arguments, or subjective mental constructs with objective rational realities.

Ultimately, the closer a person is to the understanding of the early generations (Salaf), the more knowledgeable they are in both rational and transmitted knowledge⁴³. Accordingly :

1. The statement that "reason provides definitive evidence" while "revelation provides probabilistic evidence" fails to distinguish between a mutawatir verse, a mutawatir hadith, and an ahad hadith. This is not accepted at all.

2. Then they said: "When there is a conflict between revelation and reason, we reject the revealed texts either through interpretation, suspension of judgment, or outright rejection, preserving reason." This too is not accepted, because rejection can affect reason just as it can affect revelation. So why do you reject revelation while preserving reason?

3. And thus, they concluded that if the contradiction remains apparent to reason, then attempting to reconcile the two is merely an attempt to combine opposites. However, this is itself a contradiction, for revelation is divine and free from doubt, whereas reason is influenced by acquired knowledge and thus subject to doubt.

From one perspective, how can they immediately decide that if the contradiction remains, reconciliation is an attempt to unite contradictions? Why did they not instead acknowledge their inability to discern the reconciliation and leave the matter to its rightful expert? That would have been the true scientific method.

4. Rather, they went even further and said: If the scriptural texts do not allow for interpretation or delegation and the contradiction with reason remains, we do not acknowledge the contradiction—because the scriptural text is of speculative indication, while reason is of definitive indication.

This reasoning holds only if we concede to them that reason is definitively indicative in all cases and that scriptural texts are always speculative. However, if their premise is invalidated, then their objection collapses as well.

5. And according to the fourth approach, they concluded that if there is any attempt to reconcile between what is definitively indicative and what is speculatively indicative, it constitutes a flaw in reason and contradicts pure intellect.

We would accept this premise if reason were definitively indicative in all cases—but how can this claim hold when reason itself is subject to internal contradictions?

6. And so they said: Eliminating contradictions between pure reason and authentic revelation is, in their view, a flaw in reason and its principles. That is, according to them, reconciliation is impossible because it would mean uniting contradictions.

But what if we assert that what is definitively indicative is the transmitted text (*naql*), since it is divine revelation, while reason is only speculatively indicative? In that case, what should be dismissed is reason, not revelation—this is the first point.

Secondly, if we were to keep the speculative alongside the definitive, then we would indeed be combining contradictions—thus, the argument and evidence would turn against them.

7. And they also said: Preferring revelation and prioritizing it over reason is a flaw in reason, since reason is the means by which revelation is transmitted.

This is a grave misconception because, in this case, reason serves merely as a transmitter. The transmitter—reason—has no involvement in the actual content of what is transmitted.

8. And the ninth point: If the revelatory evidence is considered speculative (*ẓanni*) in its indication, then it is not a valid proof and cannot, in principle, oppose reason.

This argument is based on the distinction between solitary reports (*āḥād*) and mass-transmitted (*mutawātir*) reports, where *mutawātir* is deemed definitive (*qaṭʿī*) and *āḥād* speculative (*ẓanni*). But what about those who do not accept the premise that *āḥād* is inherently speculative?

Moreover, some solitary reports attain the status of *mutawātir* in meaning—how do you address this?

And what about solitary reports that the Prophet himself relied upon? He would send a single individual to convey a message to a people, a group, or even just one person

9. The tenth aspect of their argument: They claim that reason, being the transmitter of revelation, has primacy in both indication and definitiveness. Since revelation is received through reason, it holds a secondary rank and thus has a speculative indication.

However, the correct response to them is that if reason establishes the truthfulness and authenticity of revelation, this does not necessarily imply the primacy of reason over revelation.

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29. ‘Umar ibn ‘Alī al-Bazzār. (n.d.). *Al-A‘lām al-Ulyā fī Manāqib Ibn Taymiyya* (manuscript, p. 6). Cited in: Mar‘ī ibn Yūsuf al-Karmī, *Al-Kawākib al-Durriyyah fī Manāqib Ibn Taymiyya*, Cairo, 1339 AH.

¹⁻ Ibn Manzur, *Lisān al-‘Arab*, edited by ‘Āmir Aḥmad Ḥaydar (Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1st ed., 2003), vol. 11, p. 458, with minor adjustments.

And also: Naṣr al-Dīn al-Muṭarrizī (538–610 AH), *al-Mughrib fī Tartīb al-Mu‘arrab*, vol. 2, pp. 75–76, edited by Muḥammad Fākhūrī and ‘Abd al-Ḥamid Mukhtār, Maktabat Usāmah ibn Zayd, Syria, 1979.

²⁻ *al-Mu‘jam al-Wasīf*, pp. 115–116, Maktabat al-Shurūq, Egypt, 4th edition, 2004.

³⁻ Jamil Saliba, *al-Mu‘jam al-Falsafi* (Dar al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, Beirut, 1982), vol. 2, pp. 84, 86, 87, 89.

⁴⁻ *al-Fayrūzābādī* (d. 817 AH), *al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ*, pp. 1033–1034, edited by Maktab al-Turāth under the supervision of Muḥammad Na‘īm al-‘Arqasūsī, al-Risālah Foundation, 8th edition, 2005.

⁵⁻ *Ibn Taymiyya, Bughyat al-Murtad*, edited by Mūsā al-Duwīsh (Maktabat al-‘Ulūm wa al-Ḥikm, 3rd ed., 1422 AH / 2001 CE), pp. 105, also 249, 251.

And also:

2. *Ibn Taymiyya, Majmū‘at al-Fatāwā*, edited and hadiths authenticated by ‘Āmir al-Jāzīr and Anwar al-Bāz (Dār al-Wafā‘, Maktabat Dār al-Riyān, Egypt, 2nd ed., 2001 CE), vol. 9, p. 153.

⁶⁻ *Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatāwā*, vol. 7, p. 24 (Medina edition).

2. *Ibn Taymiyya, Qā‘idah Jalīlah fī al-Tawassul wa al-Wasīlah*, edited and studied by Rabī‘ ibn Hādī ‘Umayr al-Madkhalī, para. 453.

⁷⁻ *Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatāwā*, vol. 8, p. 187.

⁸⁻ Ibn Manzur, *Lisān al-‘Arab*, entry 3714, edited by ‘Abdallāh ‘Alī al-Kabīr et al. (Dār al-Ma‘ārif, Cairo).

⁹⁻ *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Hadith no. 4388, “Chapter: The Arrival of the Ash‘arīs and the People of Yemen”.

¹⁰⁻ Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān al-‘Azīm*, vol. 1, p. 701.

¹¹⁻ An-Nawawī, *Yahyā ibn Sharaf Abū Zakariyyā, Al-Minhāj Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj* (Dar Iḥyā‘ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, Beirut, 2nd ed., 1392 AH), vol. 4, p. 155.

¹²⁻ *Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatāwā*, vol. 7, p. 539.

¹³⁻ *Ibid*, vol. 9, p. 271.

¹⁴⁻ Ibn Manzur, *Lisān al-‘Arab*, vol. 11, pp. 671–674 (Dār Ṣādir, Beirut, 1st ed., n.d.).

¹⁵⁻ Jamil Saliba, *al-Mu‘jam al-Falsafi*, vol. 2, pp. 504–505 (Dar al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, Beirut, 1982).

¹⁶⁻ Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Tahānawī, *Mawsū‘at Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn wa al-‘Ulūm*, vol. 2, p. 1696.

¹⁷⁻ Ibn Kathīr, *Al-Bā‘ith al-Ḥathīth Sharḥ ‘Ulūm al-Ḥadīth*, explained by Aḥmad Shākīr, annotated by Muḥammad Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Albānī, edited by ‘Alī al-Ḥalabī (Maktabat al-Ma‘ārif, Riyadh, 1st ed., 1996).

¹⁸⁻ *Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*:

Chapter: Adhān for the Traveler, Hadith no. 631.

Repeated in Chapter: Drinking While Standing, Hadith no. 5615.

Repeated in Chapter: Mercy for People and Animals, Hadith no. 6008.

Repeated in Kitāb Akhbār al-Aḥād, Hadith no. 7246.

¹⁹⁻ Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, Chapter: Recommendation to Stone the Jamrah al-‘Aqabah, Hadith no. 1297.

²⁰⁻ Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān al-‘Azīm*, vol. 2, p. 1602.

²¹⁻ *Ibn Taymiyya, Risālah fī al-‘Aql wa al-Rūḥ*, edited by Ṭāriq al-Su‘ūd (Dār al-Hijrah, Beirut, 2nd ed., 1988).

²²⁻ Edited by Rashād Sālīm, 2nd edition (11 volumes) (Dār al-Thaqāfah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1411 AH / 1991 CE).

²³⁻ *Ibn ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Maqdisī, Al-‘Uqūd al-Durriyyah min Manāqib Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad ibn Taymiyya*, edited by Muḥammad Ḥamid al-Fiqrī (Maqtūbah Maḥmūd Tawfīq, Cairo, 1938), p. 25.

²⁴⁻ ‘Umar ibn ‘Alī al-Bazzār, *Al-A‘lām al-Ulyā fī Manāqib Ibn Taymiyya* (manuscript), p. 6.

Cited by: Mar‘ī ibn Yūsuf al-Karmī, *Al-Kawākib al-Durriyyah fī Manāqib Ibn Taymiyya*, p. 153 (in *Majmū‘*, Cairo edition, 1339 AH), as quoted in: *Ibn Taymiyya, Dar’ Ta‘arūḍ al-‘Aql wa al-Naql*, edited by Rashād Sālīm, introduction, p. 5

²⁵⁻ *Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Ṭāriq al-Hijratayn wa Dār al-Sa‘ādatayn*, p. 195 (Al-Muniriyyah, 1357 AH).

²⁶⁻ *Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Ghannām, Istadrākāt Ibn Taymiyya fīmā Nussiba ilā al-Imām Aḥmad fī al-‘Ibādāt* (originally a Master’s thesis, 1425 AH).

²⁷⁻ A similar work addressing this issue is "**Al-Risāla al-‘Arshiyya**" or "**Al-Iḥāṭa**", which discusses the nature of the Throne (*al-‘Arsh*) and divine transcendence. This treatise is printed at the end of **Volume 6 of Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā**.

²⁸⁻ The ten points have been summarized from *Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā* (16/463-473) and are found in *Dar’ Ta‘arūḍ* (Vol. 1, pp. 87-88).

²⁹Op-cit , p (443/16)

³⁰Op-cit , p (12/81)

³¹Op-cit , (212/12-213)

³²Op-cit , p (332/22)

³³Op-cit , p (16/251)

³⁴Op-cit , p (173/33)

³⁵ -The Book of Genesis, p108

³⁶- Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Book: The Beginning of Creation, Hadith no. 3018.

³⁷- Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī, Silsilat al-Aḥādīth al-Ḍaʿīfah wa al-Mawḍūʿah wa Atharuhā al-Sayyi' fi al-Ummah, vol. 3, p. 408.

³⁸- Silsilat al-Aḥādīth al-Ḍaʿīfah wa al-Mawḍūʿah, Hadith no. 2345.

³⁹- Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatāwā, vol. 16, p. 442.

⁴⁰Op-cit , p (10/472)

⁴¹Op-cit , p (5/518)

⁴²Op-cit , p (6/296)

⁴³- Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatāwā, vol. 3, p. 228.